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A review of Solomon Islands was not
available for this issue.
FIJI
The first significant event of the year
came in February when the country
went to snap polls following the defeat
of the budget in November 1993. The
budget was defeated by 10 government
backbenchers who joined 27 Indo-
Fijian opposition members to vote
against it. Sitiveni Rabuka's oppo-
nents had hoped to use the election to
oust him from office, but they miscal-
culated. Confounding critics and dissi-
dents, Rabuka and his party, the
Soqosoqo ni Vakavulewa ni Taukei
(SVT), returned to power with 32 of the
37 seats reserved for ethnic Fijians
under the 1990 constitution, and
formed a coalition government with
the General Voters Party. On the.Indo-
Fijian side, the National Federation
Party increased its parliamentary
majority from 14 to 20, while the Fiji
Labour Party won the remaining 7
allocated to the Indo-Fijian community
(LaI1994)·
Fijian parties including the Fijian
Christian National United Front, led
by the fiery nationalist Sakiasi Buta-
droka, and the All Nationals Congress,
led by Apisai Tora, failed to win any
seats, while SVT'S chief rival, Josefata
Kamikamica's newly formed Fijian
Association Party, with Ratu Finau
Mara as one of its candidates, man-
aged to win only five seats, three of
them in Lau where President Ratu
Mara is the paramount chief. Kamika-
mica, silently backed by Mara, lost his
Tailevu seat to SVT'S candidate, Bau
high chief Adi Samanunu Talakuli.
Rabuka accused his Fijian detractors
of disloyalty and treachery and asked
his people for a second chance. They
responded. The Indo-Fijian side of the
electorate preferred Jai Ram Reddy's
moderate, conciliatory stance to
Labour leader Mahendra Chaudhary's
more aggressive tone.
Back in office with a secure man-
date, Rabuka promised the country a
"stable, decisive, consistent and coher-
ent" government (PR, 21 Mar 1994).
To that end, he resurrected a previous,
hastily conceived proposal to include
the National Federation Party (NFP) in
a coalition government. The sugges-
tion came in typical Rabuka fashion,
without consultation or prior discus-
sion with anyone, including his parlia-
mentary caucus. Neither his own party
nor the NFP knew precisely what
Rabuka had in mind. "The door will
be kept open but it will require careful
consultations on both sides and
between ourselves," he said (FT, I Mar
1994). Reddy was unimpressed. Call-
ing Rabuka's offer "highly specula-
tive," he cautioned, "The potential
gulf between us and the Government
on a future constitution of Fiji could
be so enormous that it would be
utterly unrealistic for the opposition to
get locked into a government of
national unity until such time that we
are able to narrow down those differ-
ences" (FT, 4 Mar 1994). Nothing
more was heard of the proposal.
Fulfilling his campaign promise to
provide a lean and effective govern-
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ment, Rabuka began by reducing the
size of his cabinet from 25 (including 7
ministers of state) to 12. Dropped
from the cabinet were Rabuka's long-
time ally from the Taukei Movement
days, Ratu Inoke Kubuabola, and the
powerful Macuata politician Militoni
Leweniqila, the prime minister's uncle.
Leweniqila was brought back into cab-
inet later in the year, along with Filipe
Bole, the defeated SVT candidate for
Lau, who was subsequently rewarded
with a seat on the senate and from
there inducted into the cabinet as
minister for foreign affairs. Kubuabola
became a thorn in Rabuka's side.
Among other things, he revealed
embarrassing details of the prime min-
ister's tryst with a Fijian journalist in
an effort to force him to resign from
office. Rabuka refused, and the parlia-
mentary caucus of the SVT endorsed his
decision after being told that the prime
minister had confessed the incident to
his wife and his pastor. Still, Rabuka's
personal reputation, as a moral leader
and lay Methodist preacher, suffered a
setback. Many also questioned his
judgment about appointing the contro-
versial millionaire businessman and
close personal friend Jim Ah Koy, one
of the two Fijian members from
Kadavu, to the important Trade and
Industry portfolio and empowering
him with full responsibility for all gov-
ernment-owned companies, corpora-
tions, and statutory authorities. Ah
Koy, many said, was the real power
behind the Rabuka throne.
Among those dissatisfied with the
cabinet reshuffles and the manner of
Rabuka's intervention in other minis-
ters' portfolios was the General Voters
Party (GVP). Not only was their num-
ber in the cabinet reduced to one (later
restored to two), but Rabuka also gave
the impression of treating his GVP
ministers with little respect. He first
relieved Minister of Tourism and Civil
Aviation Harold Powell of responsibil-
ity for the national carrier Air Pacific,
and then overruled Minister for Infra-
structure and Public Works Leo
Smith's decision to sack for incompe-
tence Ilaisa Senimoli, an ethnic Fijian,
as director general of the Ports Author-
ity of Fiji. These developments, which
followed the GVP'S well-publicized
policy differences with the sVT-the
GVP opposed the Sunday ban, the Seri-
ous Fraud Bill, and (silently) the trans-
fer of state land to the Native Land
Trust Board-disenchanted many
party supporters. "No one is taking
the party seriously any more because
of the way we are being treated," said
one party founder. "It's becoming a
joke" (TR, Dec 1994). How the GVP
negotiates its relationship with its
Fijian coalition partner will bear
watching.
Rabuka's relationship with the
opposition NFP and FLP was equally
turbulent. Early in the year, he hinted
in parliament at the possibility of a
third and possibly more violent coup if
Indo-Fijians continued to oppose his
political agenda, which led both
parties to stage a two-day boycott of
parliament. Then came cabinet's deci-
sion to abolish Diwali and Prophet
Mohammed's birthdays as national
holidays and to replace them with a
single holidaY-14 May, the date of
both the first coup and the arrival of
Indian indentured laborers in Fiji. The
decision was rescinded only after wide-
spread protest by Hindus, Muslims,
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and Christians alike, creating skepti-
cism in the general public about the
government's commitment to multicul-
turalism. Provoked by these actions,
the NFP and FLP downplayed their dif-
ferences and began cooperating on
issues critical to their constituencies.
On the Fijian side, too, Rabuka's
opponents began exploring the pos-
sibility of joining hands. A series of
meetings took place between the Fijian
Association Party and the All Nation-
als Congress, now headed by Adi
Kuini Bavadra (TR, Oct 1994). What-
ever the outcomes of these talks, the
truth remains that the difference
between Rabuka and his Fijian oppo-
nents is not one of substance, for they
all agree on the principle of Fijian
paramountcy, but one of degree. They
all want Indo-Fijian participation in
government; none of them wants full
partnership.
Speculation that Rabuka's oppo-
nents in parliament might once again
use the budget debate to defeat the
government proved unfounded as
Finance Minister Berenado Vunibobo
presented what he called a "mild and
affordable budget" (SSD, 2 Dec 1994)
with a net deficit estimated at US$43.6
million, or 2.5 percent of the gross
domestic product. Expenditure was
estimated at US$582.7 million, and
revenue at US$487.8 million. Excise
duty was increased on alcoholic bever-
ages, tobacco, and all types of motor
vehicles and motor fuel. The opposi-
tion questioned the government's
expenditure priorities, in particular the
allocation of F$ 38 million to the Fiji
Military Forces, which have had a
consistent history of overspending.
In 1993, for example, an unapproved
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F$9 million was granted to the army,
and in September 1994, another F$9
million was appropriated from addi-
tional provisions for military emolu-
ments and allowances (TR, Dec
1994)·
In contrast, the police force was
allocated only Fh3.8 million for its
recurrent expenditure. Police Commis-
sioner Isikia Savua had asked for more
than F$30 million to equip the force
with more personnel, vehicles, and
sophisticated communications systems
to combat crime. He wanted the police
'to become more visible in the commu-
nity. To boost morale, he also pro-
posed better insurance cover for
them (FT, 22 Dec 1994). The govern-
ment's reluctance to commit more
resources to the police dismayed
many, especially because there was a
marked increase in crime during the
year. By October, only 5,27° of the
16,257 crimes reported to police had
been solved. Murder and attempted
murder recorded the highest percent-
age increase, followed by rape or
attempted rape, robbery with violence,
drug-related crimes, serious assault,
fraud offenses, theft and burglary, and
house break-ins (FT, 8 Dec 1994). Per-
haps even more disturbing than the
increase in the number of crimes, is the
occurrence of violent crimes in rural
areas by urban youth, mainly young
Fijian men. The government wants to
strengthen rural Fijian cultural institu-
tions to stem the flow of Fijian youth
to urban areas. It has even talked of
resurrecting the old Fijian court system
to deal with Fijian criminals. Whether
any of these initiatives will bear fruit
remains to be seen, but crime, and all
the problems associated with it, is
".'
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increasingly becoming a depressing
feature of life in Fiji (TR, Nov 1994).
Rabuka received mixed reviews on
the domestic front. On the external
front, however, he fared slightly better.
During the year, he made several state
visits, the main aim being to normalize
Fiji's external relations and to improve
trade. His visit to the People's Republic
of China late in September promised
more economic cooperation and fur-
ther improvements in trade, which
increased from USh.3 million in 1976
to US$25.25 million in 1993 (SSD,June
1994). China has already invested
F$5.4 million in eleven enterprises in
Fiji, and offered an interest-free loan of
F$5 million (PR, 3 Oct 1994). While in
Beijing, Rabuka asked the People's
Republic of China to establish a volun-
teer program, like the American Peace
Corps, in Fiji. In June, Rabuka visited
Australia to open Fiji's Consulate-
General in Sydney, designed to
improve economic relations between
the two countries. Australia's annual
export of goods and services to Fiji
exceeds US$200 million, while Fiji's
exports to Australia are valued at
us$86.6 million (SSD, 14 July 1994)·
Rabuka also raised concerns over the
terms of SPARTECA (South Pacific
Regional Trade and Economic Cooper-
ation Agreement), which, he said, were
being used by Australia to place bar-
riers on duty-free access to its markets
for exports from island country mem-
bers of the South Pacific Forum (PR, I I
July 1994). Farther afield, Japan, the
third largest buyer of Fiji's sugar,
promised to increase its purchase to
100,000 tonnes, and the Malaysia
Borneo Finance Group bought one of
Fiji's oldest trading houses, the Car-
penter Group of Companies. Mem-
bers of the Fiji Trade and Investment
Board visited Thailand, Singapore, and
Malaysia to strengthen emerging Asia-
Pacific trade and manufacturing links.
On his overseas trips, Rabuka
assured his hosts that his government
was committed to resolving the one
issue that remains a stumbling block in
Fiji's relationship with the interna-
tional community: the racially
weighted 1990 constitution. Rabuka
committed himself to a review of the
constitution, but exactly how that was
to be accomplished remained a matter
of dispute and debate throughout the
year. The terms for a constitutional
commission were agreed between the
government and the opposition in
1993 (Lal 1994). In August, a 20-
member parliamentary select commit-
tee was appointed, consisting of II
government and 9 opposition mem-
bers. This committee was to determine
the size and composition of the com-
mission, receive its report, and facili-
tate its passage through parliament.
After several confidential meetings, the
committee agreed on a 12-member
commission, comprising 6 ethnic
Fijians,s Indo-Fijians and I General
Voter, but further discussions stalled
on the question of who would chair it.
The government was adamant that
the chair should be a local, though in
May it had agreed to an independent
chair from overseas (DP, 10 Oct 1994).
The person it had in mind was Chief
Justice Sir Timoci Tuivaga. Why a
local? asked Filipe Bole, the govern-
ment's spokesman on the review,
"Why should I have someone from
outside to tell me, to lead me into a
constitution which is acceptable to
POLITICAL REVIEWS
me?" (PR, 28 Nov 1994). The opposi-
tion, on the other hand, pressed for an
outside jurist of international reputa-
tion. Bole accused them of lack of
patriotism, saying the Indo-Fijians
"would be more satisfied if things were
spelled out for them by non-Fijians."
The Indo-Fijians, he asserted, did not
have "the same emotional attachment
to the country as the indigenous peo-
pie." Unable to move the government,
the opposition threatened to boycott
parliament and abandon the review
process altogether. That was averted
when in November the government
reluctantly agreed to a three-member
commission, to be made up of one
Fijian, one Indo-Fijian, and an outside
chair. Whether the government will
abide by its undertaking to have an
independent review of the constitution
remains to be seen, for powerful sec-
tions of the Fijian community, includ-
ing the Great Council of Chiefs, want
no dilution of the power they enjoy
under the present constitution. Filipe
Bole himself conceded that the idea
that Fiji's political leadership should
always remain in Fijian hands "is very
deeply entrenched and will be very dif-
ficult to erase" (TR, Nov 1994).
Protection of Fijian interests, very
broadly defined, will have to be the
cornerstone of the revised constitution,
recognizing the Fijian view that politi-
cal leadership in "their country" is
not passed on to others "through the
accident of an introduced political
system." The Indo-Fijian leaders,
whatever their other differences, are
adamant that they will never accept a
constitutional arrangement, like the
present one, that will consign their
community to political irrelevance.
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Amid all the problems, there is some
room for optimism. The government is
mindful of international pressure and
has floated proposals for power shar-
ing, even though these are vague at this
stage. For example, a system of pro-
portional representation has been
mooted. A proper and broadly accept-
able review of the constitution could
pave the way for Fiji's reentry to the
British Commonwealth and reestablish
the severed links with the British mon-
archy. The constitution will be at the
top of Fiji's political agenda in 1995.
Another issue likely to dominate
public discussion is the renewal of
agricultural leases, which begin to
expire in 1997. Just how difficult the
discussion could become was evident
in the defeat of the FLP'S motion in par-
liament to form a joint select commit-
tee to begin talks on extending the
expiring leases. Such an arrangement
has been used from time to time to
resolve issues that impinge on impor-
tant national interests. But the govern-
ment refused, saying it would only
"play the role of facilitator and an
interested administrator in the negotia-
tions between the true players and
ALTA [Agricultural Landlord and Ten-
ant Act]," the true players being the
landlords and the tenants (DP, 16 Nov
1994). This hands-off approach will
suit the Fijian landlords, who own vir-
tually all the agricultural land in Fiji,
and who expect to get premiums for
renewals starting from F$15,000,
something which, according to deputy
leader Harish Sharma, is specifically
excluded from ALTA. The Indo-Fijian
tenants, vulnerable at the best of times,
will face an uphill battle in negotiating
renewals with the monolithic land-
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owner representative, the Native
Lands Trust Board. Meanwhile, Indo-
Fijian tenants in parts of Viti Levu
have already begun to enter into de
facto share cropping arrangements
with their Fijian landlords. Lease
renewals could very likely become an
explosive political issue. Fijian politi-
cians, such as former Minister of Pri-
mary Industry Koresi Matatolu, have
already linked renewals, on whatever
terms, to Indo-Fijian acceptance of
Fijian political dominance. In all, 1994
was a relatively quiet year for Fiji after
the turbulence of the February snap
elections. With the review of the con-
stitution, negotiations for the renewal
of expiring agricultural leases, and the
law-and-order situation likely to domi-
nate Fiji's public agenda in 1995, 1994
may come in due course to be seen as
the lull before the storm.
BRIJ V LAL
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NEW CALEDONIA
If the 1980s were a time of confronta-
tions, when Kanak nationalists gained
greater access to the political power
structure, the 1990S seem to be a time
of negotiations over the self-determi-
nation issue. Director of the Protestant
Educational Alliance Billy Wapotro
says that no one wants to return to the
violence of the past and that Kanak
nationalism must now employ "strate-
gies to exorcise fear." Even Jacques
LaFleur, leader of the pro-French
RassembLement pour La CaLedonie
dans La RepubLique (RPcR)-and a fel-
low Protestant-is capable, Wapotro
believes, of a "cure of the soul." In
fact, LaFleur first proposed a "consen-
sual solution" in 1991, to make the
1998 referendum on independence less
of a "guillotine." Sylvain Pabouty, of
the Political Bureau of the Front de
Liberation NationaLe Kanak et SociaL-
iste (FLNKS), calls its new task a "labor
of ants": day-to-day dialogue and
mutual education that may not show
up in the news headlines.
French Minister for Overseas Terri-
tories Dominique Perben reiterated
his commitment to "Matignon II."
The Matignon Accord of 1988
brought peace and granted more local
power and development money to the
FLNKs-ruled Northern and Islands
Provinces, while the RPCR still controls
the more populous, multiethnic and
industrial Southern Province. Perben
vowed to infuse the postconfronta-
tional phase of Matignon with more
"elan" to achieve two goals: intereth-
nic consensus and socioeconomic
progress. He announced a 2.28 percent
increase in his ministry's budget and
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listened favorably to the request of
Paul Neaoutyine, president of FLNKS
and mayor of the northern town of
Poindimie, to keep the French aid
money- flowing. French High Commis-
sioner Alain Christnacht, respected as
a Matignon supporter, was replaced in
August by Didier Cultiaux, former
administrator of Reunion. In less than
a month, the new commissioner's own
staff went on strike, and he began to
clamp down on both union picketing
and the proliferation of squatters
around Noumea. On a visit to a local
educational agency, Cultiaux said that
the Kanak identity is not only tradi-
tional but also "mixed," because of
colonialism. "We must not forget," he
added, "that we are a francophone
ship in an anglophone ocean."
In May, the pro-independence
Protestant churches called together
an international roundtable to evalu-
ate progress under the Matignon
Accord. The general conclusion,
Wapotro said, was that "1998 is a race
we don't want to run." He was partic-
ularly concerned that young Kanaks
should be well grounded in their own
culture as they seek diplomas for jobs
in the modern sector. The curricula of
the former Kanak Peoples Schools
have in large part been absorbed by
the Protestant educational system.
The role of the FLNKS in nation-
building has changed, now that it has
been participating in local governance
for over six years. Willy Gorodite of
the Poindimie mayor's office says that
voters are expecting tangible, material
rewards, such as jobs for educated
young Kanak. Of. 2II graduates from
the "400 cadres" training program, 74
percent are Kanak, mostly female, and
employed by the government. The
Northern Province is using French aid
to build schools, clinics, and a new
cross-island road, as well as investing
in a nickel mine and a tourist resort.
The road is costly and, like the new
ferryboat between Noumea and
Ouvea, has become a target for loyalist
critics of "wasteful" spending.
In the fall, party congresses met to
organize their campaigns for the spring
1995 elections. LaFleur warned his
followers about the danger of "racist
independence" after 1998 if the FLNKS
won, and called for a thirty-year pact
on New Caledonia's future after the
1995 vote. He proposed territorial
unity, more devolution of decision-
making from Paris to Noumea, and
hard work by all Caledonians to prove
themselves worthy of autonomy.
LaFleur also suggested rewording the
1998 referendum to "avoid the direct
and fatal question of yes or no to inde-
pendence." These ideas, along with his
proposal that a party must obtain at
least 5 percent of all registered voters
to win a seat, were opposed by the
FLNKS. A millionaire businessman who
has been accused of monopolistic
cronyism to keep control of the local
economy, LaFleur decried the closure
of Noumea's port for two weeks by
labor unions and recommended that
France build a second port to prevent
New Caledonia from being held "hos-
tage." Loyalty Islander Dick Ukeiwe,
who had left the RPCR in 1993 to form
his own party, returned in September
to the loyalist fold, which he said rep-
resented "the voice of reason."
"A consensual solution," Gorodite,
says, "means to live together." That
theme is argued strongly by Fran~ois
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Burke, president of the Union Caledo-
nienne (uc), the largest party in the
FLNKS. Founded in the 1940S on the
motto Two Colors, One People, the uc
has come out in favor of multiracial
independence through negotiation.
On the eve of the twenty-fifth DC
Congress in November, Burke contin-
ued to speak of evolutionary change:
"We are living in a period of long-term
apprenticeship ... we are not ready for
independence in 1998, it's a reality."
He opposes LaFleur's thirty-year pact
on the grounds that the country will
need maximum flexibility in the
decades ahead. Yet the uc reaffirmed
its goal of independence by propos-
ing that France concede some govern-
ment powers after the 1995 elections,
namely those over immigration, for-
eign trade, mineral resources, labor
laws, and education. Other FLNKS
parties, such as PALIKA (Parti de Libe-
ration Kanak), criticized growing
"immobility" in the decolonization pro-
cess. The idea of national union lists in
the local 1995 elections, to mobilize
sentiments for independence in 1998,
won both uc and PALIKA support.
Caught in between, the Wallisian
minority (9 percent of the population)
is being courted by both sides as a
potential swing vote. Michel Hema, of
the moderate Union Oceanienne (uo),
wants to establish a Wallisian voice in
New Caledonia separate from the
RPCR, which he says used his compa-
triots as "cannon fodder" against the
Kanaks in the 1980s. Yet the uo will
not come out in support of Kanak
independence until it gets "guaran-
tees," Hema says, "for our children."
Wallis and Futuna, as an overpopu-
lated, resource-poor French territory, is
not a viable place to return to if the
Kanaks decide immigrant workers and
their families are not fellow "victims of
history." In the March 1993 legislative
election, police chief Aloisio Sako led a
rival faction of the uo that was open
to independence; it won 300 more
votes than Hema's moderates. On 12
February 1994, Sako formed a new
political party, the Rassemblement De-
mocratique Odanien (RDO), 92 per-
cent of whose founding delegates voted
in favor of Kanak independence. Sako
says that many Wallisians have now
grown up in New Caledonia, and they
hope to find a place in its future while
recognizing indigenous paramountcy.
French Interior Minister Charles
Pasqua, who is himself running for the
national presidency in 1995, supports
centralization to ensure that France
remains a united republic in 2015. Pas-
qua suspended Sako and called for a
disciplinary council to address the
Noumea police chief's "lack of
reserve." Sako received support from
the FLNKS, Oscar Temaru of Tahiti,
Kamilo Gata (Wallis and Futuna's dele-
gate to Paris), and New Caledonia's
largest labor union, USTKE (Union
Syndicaliste des Travailleurs Kanak et
des Exploites), but a hearing in August
imposed a one-year suspension on
him and referred his case to Paris for
further review. The RDO accused
local loyalists of "telecommanding"
trumped-up charges from Pasqua, even
though the independence issue should
be a legitimate topic for the 1995 elec-
tions as well as the 1998 referendum.
Despite Perben's rhetoric about con-
sensus, the Sako affair raises serious
questions about the kinds of free
speech that France is willing to toler-
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ate. LaFleur's condemnation of "racist
independence" in September incurred
no rebuke from Cultiaux.
Union activity was strong again in
I994,.from a violent nickel truckers'
strike in May, to a stoppage of Air
France flights out of Noumea in July,
to port closures in August and Septem-
ber, each of which lasted about two
weeks. Led by Louis Kotra Uregei,
USTKE sees itself as the multiracial
vanguard of a new nation: socialist
and supportive of Kanak sovereignty.
USTKE is reconciling with the FLNKS
after bitter accusations following the
assassinations of Jean-Marie Tjibaou
and Yeiwene Yeiwene in 1989 by a
Loyalty Islander (Uregei's province).
Tahitian docker organizer Michel
Teharuru argues that New Caledonia's
resources should be nationalized and
that more local industries should be
developed to reduce import depen-
dency. Most critics of the status quo
agree on broadening the economic
base in a society distorted by the infla-
tionary "hardship" salaries paid to
French metropolitan officials. In
October, the Societe le Nickel (SLN),
New Caledonia's largest mining firm,
announced that because of a global
rise in nickel demand, it would
increase production by 20 percent.
Internationally, the Melanesian
Spearhead Group supported Vanu-
atu's suggestion that the three French
Pacific Overseas Territories be permit-
ted observer status at the South Pacific
Forum. The FLNKS rejected the idea,
preferring observer status as a polit-
ical party. In March, the United
Nations Committee on Decoloniza-
tion expressed concern that the seizure
in Noumea of a cache of arms linked
to right-wing French extremists was a
sign that the self-determination of New
Caledonia was in jeopardy. Yann
Celene Uregei traveled to New York in
October to request renewed pressure
from the United Nations committee for
the freedom of Kanaky. Delegates from
the post-Matignon Consultative Coun-
cil on Customary Affairs went to Vanu-
atu and Fiji to study land-tenure
systems and found Fiji's tourist hotels
impressive. The FLNKS has invested
heavily in tourism in the North and
Islands but sometimes comes into con-
flict with local chiefs over land use.
As the FLNKS celebrated its tenth
anniversary on 18 November, uc
President Burke warned that the
twenty-first century will belong to the
Asia-Pacific, so that dialogue, sound
leadership, and gradual change are
the keys to the country's future. One
month earlier, French troops had
reminded New Caledonians of the past
alternative, by conducting field exer-
cises in the North (with Australian
and New Zealand military personnel
observing).
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PAPUA NEW GUINEA
Prime Minister Sir Julius Chan stated
in his Christmas address that 1994 was
the most turbulent, painful, and unpre-
dictable of the nation's nineteen years
of independence (PC, 28 Dec 1994, 5).
Most who witnessed the sudden
change of government in August, the
volcanic destruction of Rabaul in Sep-
tember, the dramatic collapse of peace
talks on war-weary Bougainville in
October, the ominous confrontations
over provincial government reform,
the confusion surrounding the giant
Lihir gold project, and the multi-
billion-kina environmental lawsuit
against the operators of the Ok Tedi
mine, would agree. Affecting all of
these issues and events was an unprec-
edented financial crisis, whose impact
will be felt for some time.
The early part of the year was dom-
inated by power struggles between
dominant members of the ruling coali-
tion, especially between Prime Minis-
ter Paias Wingti and Deputy Prime
Minister Julius Chan. The ongoing rift
between the two leaders had been
pushed wide open by Wingti's reelec-
tion ploy of September 1993, executed
without Chan's knowledge or approval
(Wesley-Smith 1994,455). In January
1994 Wingti strengthened his hand by
ousting Chan from the powerful
finance portfolio and replacing him
with a staunch ally, former Minister
for Mining and Petroleum Masket
Iangalio (PC, II Jan 1994, I).
Although obviously unhappy with the
reshuffle, Chan had little option but to
accept the Foreign Affairs and Trade
ministry instead (PC, 13 Jan 1994, 3)'
The extent of the disarray in the coali-
tion was soon revealed by a contro-
versy over the reappointment of the
commander of the defense force.
After Wingti left for visits to Aus-
tralia and New Zealand in early Feb-
ruary, Acting Prime Minister Chan
announced that Defence Force Com-
mander Robert Dademo had passed
the stipulated retirement age and
been replaced by Colonel Lima
Dotaona. This cabinet decision was
confirmed by Minister for Defence
Paul Tohian, Chan's colleague in the
Peoples Progress Party. Soon after the
announcement, however, staff in
Wingti's office indicated that the cabi-
net had decided in a subsequent meet-
ing to change the compulsory retire-
ment age from fifty to fifty-five and
reappoint Dademo. Neither Chan nor
Tohian was present when these deci-
sions were made, and they refused to
acknowledge Dademo's reappoint-
ment (PC, 17 Feb 1994, I). Their dis-
satisfaction was shared by some in the
officer corps who claimed that cabi-
net's action "undermines the spirit of
the Defence Act and the National
Constitution" (Dorney I994a, 20).
The dispute intensified when
Dademo and Finance Minister Iangalio
accompanied an Australian television
news crew to Bougainville. Chan told
the press that he had not authorized
the journalists' visit to the troubled
province, and threatened to deport
them. Presumably under orders from
Chan, army intelligence officers
searched Iangalio when he returned
to Port Moresby and confiscated
some film from his expatriate adviser.
Iangalio in turn led the charge against
Chan and his party colleagues, defeat-
ing a new attempt in cabinet to dump
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Dademo. He told Chan that the televi-
sion crew had been invited to visit
Bougainville by Wingti, and any move
against it would "make the prime
minister and PNG a laughingstock"
(Dorney I994a, 21). The issue was
eventually laid to rest when Wingti
returned and declared that the decision
to retain Dademo was "final" (PC, 21
Feb 1994,3). Adding insult to Chan's
injury, instead of ordering the televi-
sion journalists to leave, Wingti invited
them to his Mount Hagen home (PC,
18 Feb 1994, 2).
Iangalio and his successor as mining
minister, John Kaputin, also disagreed
publicly. In April, Iangalio dismissed
Bob Needham as head of the Mineral
Resources Development Corporation,
a move that Kaputin claimed lacked
cabinet approval (PC, 14 April 1994,
I). Then in June, when Kaputin sur-
prised everybody by announcing a
moratorium on new mining projects,
Iangalio told the press that the plan
had not been discussed in cabinet and
would not be approved if it were (AFR,
7 June 1994, 22). Meanwhile, Chan's
Peoples Progress Party and some
members of the League for National
Advancement were targeting Speaker
Bill Skate, accusing him of using his
privileged position in Parliament to
build his own power base (PC, 2 Aug
1994, I; 4 Aug 1994, 3)·
Under the spirited leadership of
Pangu Pati's Chris Haiveta, the parlia-
mentary opposition attacked the frac-
tured Wingti government from the
outside. Haiveta produced evidence in
Parliament to suggest that Wingti had
bashed and attempted to strangle his
former wife, Diane Kende-Wingti.
He claimed that Kende-Wingti had
told former electoral commissioner
Luke Lucas of the attack and also
informed him that Wingti was hav-
ing an affair with Lucas's estranged
wife. Most damaging was Haiveta's
suggestion that the prime minister had
tried to dissuade Lucas from taking
action against him by paying Lucas
US$IOO,OOO and arranging for him to
be appointed secretary of justice in
1993. Wingti dismissed the claims as
"gutter politics" and refused to answer
them publicly (PC, 3 March 1994, I; I
June 1994, I).
These attacks may have reduced
Wingti's already battered public stand-
ing, but the only effective way of chal-
lenging his leadership before the 1997
elections was via a parliamentary vote
of no confidence. However, Speaker
Bill Skate indicated early in the year
that he would not allow such a
motion. Wingti's snap reelection in
September 1993, he argued, had
earned him the eighteen months of
immunity from such challenges guar-
anteed by the constitution (PC, 18 Feb
1994, I). True to his word, Skate
refused to accept notice of a motion of
no confidence filed by the opposition
in June (TPNG, 9 June 1994,29). Then
on 25 August 1994 the Supreme Court
decided that Wingti's reelection in
September 1993 was unconstitutional
and Parliament would have to conduct
a new election for prime minister.
The legal challenge to Wingti's
reelection spearheaded by Chris
Haivetahad been dismissed by the
National Court in late 1993, but
brought on appeal to the Supreme
Court. When the private law firm
working for the opposition withdrew
its services, its fees unpaid, former
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Attorney General Bernard Narokobi
agreed to argue the case. He told the
court that he accepted the legality of
Wingti's resignation on 23 September
1993. However, he noted that Section
142(3) of the constitution requires that
an election be held the next sitting
day after Parliament is informed of a
vacancy. The Speaker knew of the res-
ignation on the twenty-third, but did
not inform the house until immediately
before conducting the election the next
day (TPNG, I I Aug 1994,4). Appar-
ently dismissing Wingti's case that
advice to the Speaker was the same as
advice to the house, the five judges
ruled unanimously that the actions vio-
lated the constitution, its spirit, and its
underlying principles.
The Supreme Court decision trig-
gered a frenzy of political activity, as
leaders scrambled to position them-
selves for the election on 3a August.
On 29 August Sir Julius Chan formally
severed his alliance with Paias Wingti,
accusing him of wanting to "hold on
to power for power's sake," and of
running "a one-man show" (TPNG, I
Sept 1994,19). He announced a coali-
tion between the Peoples Progress
Party, Pangu Pati, and a cluster of
smaller parties. At about the same
time, rumors began to circulate that
members of the Peoples Democratic
Movement were seeking an alternative
to Wingti as their candidate for prime
minister. When Parliament convened
the next day, Bill Skate was carrying
the flag for what remained of the
Wingti camp. Pangu member and
former Prime Minister Rabbie Nama-
liu beat Tom Koraea to become the
new Speaker of the house, while Chan
easily won the vote for prime minister
with 69 votes to Skate's 32 (TPNG, I
Sept 1994, I).
Although Chan was able to argue
convincingly that Wingti was largely
responsible for his own downfall,
observers were more skeptical of the
new prime minister's ability to "restore
and reinvigorate" trust in government.
Chan and his party had worked with
Wingti for nearly a decade, and the
seven ministers reappointed to the new
cabinet would have to share some of
the responsibility for the "long trail of
mismanagement and scandal" that
Chan decried. Nor was his new coali-
tion immune from the "unceasing
jockeying for positions of power" that
he said infected the political process
"like a vicious disease" (TPNG, 8 Sept
1994,36). The swearing-in of new
ministers had to be delayed while dif-
ferences among the coalition partners
over the spoils of office were sorted
out. In the end, the Peoples Progress
Party claimed 13 of the 27 cabinet
positions, with Pangu, led by Deputy
Prime Minister Chris Haiveta, taking
9. Melanesian Alliance party stalwarts
John Momis and Bernard Narokobi
got the communication and agriculture
portfolios respectively, while the
National Party was represented by
Paul Pora (civil aviation and tourism)
and Mathias Ijape (defense). Leader of
the League for National Advancement
John Nilkare, who had defected from
the Wingti camp at the last minute,
was conspicuously absent from the
lineup (TPNG, 8 Sept 1994, I).
Chan's decisive action on the Bou-
gainville crisis confounded the critics,
at least for a while. The Wingti govern-
ment had begun 1994 under intense
pressure to find a solution to the seces-
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sionist crisis, then entering its sixth
year. Some of the pressure came from
the United Nations Commission on
Human Rights, which passed a
strongly worded resolution on the
Bougainville situation in March 1994.
It criticized Papua New Guinea for its
lack of responsiveness to earlier resolu-
tions and effectively gave the govern-
ment until 30 September to facilitate
the commission's investigation of
human rights abuses on the island
(Commonwealth of Australia 1994a,
122-124). However, the escalating
economic cost of the situation may
have been more telling.
The government's very success in
the battle for the hearts and minds of
Bougainvilleans meant that the costs of
the military operation were increasing.
The immediate needs of displaced per-
sons emerging from rebel-controlled
areas had to be met in government
"care centers" even before the costs of
restoring infrastructure and normal
services could be contemplated. In
March, an estimated forty-four thou-
sand people were in care centers,
and by June the number had swelled
to at least sixty thousand, perhaps
close to half of the population of the
province (PC, 16 March 1994, 2; 27
June 1994, I). In August, Minister
for Finance Iangalio estimated that
the Bougainville operation was cost-
ing the government directly between
60 and 80 million kina per year, even
before the lost income from the Pan-
guna mine and other export indus-
tries was considered (TPNG, 25 Aug
1994,27)·
The government could ill afford
these costs as the fiscal crisis (discussed
later) deepened during the year.
Indeed, many costs were simply not
met. The care centers suffered periodic
food shortages, bills for essential sup-
plies remained unpaid, and military
operations were constantly hampered
by lack of funds. At one point, all of
the Defence Force helicopters were out
of order, and the chartered helicopters
were grounded because the terms of
operation for the civilian pilots had
expired (TPNG, 9 June 1994, 2). Mean-
while, with no military solution in
sight, the death toll continued to rise.
In the worst single incident, fourteen
people were killed and more than
twenty-five wounded when a convoy
of trucks was ambushed by rebel
forces near Buin in March (PC, 25
March 1994, I; 28 March 1994, I).
The first public indication that the
government was eager to break the
impasse came in February, when Prime
Minister Wingti invited Australia to
send a parliamentary delegation to the
province. Senator Stephen Loosley led
the delegation to Bougainville in April
and emphasized that a military solu-
tion was impossible. He urged instead
a ceasefire and a peace and reconcilia-
tion conference, and suggested that
"sympathetic third party involvement"
in the peace process might be helpful
(Commonwealth of Australia 1994a,
41-45). More important than its spe-
cific recommendations was the delega-
tion's role as "catalyst" and "circuit
breaker" (Commonwealth of Australia
1994b, 1474)· Even before the delega-
tion's report was released, Prime Min-
ister Wingti announced a huge increase
in funding for the security forces in the
province, as well as plans to establish a
Human Rights Commission and a
Police Complaints unit to deal with
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allegations of human rights abuse
(TPNG, 2 June 1994).
Much of the impetus behind the
push for peace in 1994 came from Sir
Julius Chan. Soon after he was rele-
gated to the foreign affairs portfolio in
February he began to solicit support
for a regional peacekeeping force to be
deployed on Bougainville. Shortly after
this initiative was made public (by the
King of Tonga) in the last week of
May, secret talks began in Honiara
between Papua New Guinea officials
and representatives of the Bougainville
Interim Government. This was the first
time officials had met face-to-face with
rebel representatives since 1991, and a
"record of proceedings" signed on I I
June established a broad framework
for further talks (SMH, 8 June 1994, 3;
14 June 1994,3)· However, the next
round was canceled abruptly after a
dispute over who should represent the
rebel side, and Chan insisted that
future talks be with the top officials
"calling the tune in Bougainville" (PC,
28 June 1994, 2).
Meanwhile, other government lead-
ers were pursuing a rather different
agenda on Bougainville. In the second
week of August defense force troops
advanced into the rebel heartland and
raided the mining town of Panguna.
Although Prime Minister Wingti hailed
this as a "historic moment" and
Finance Minister Iangalio talked about
reopening the copper mine, Chan con-
demned the move and later apologized
for it (TPNG, 18 Aug 1994, I; 25 Aug
1994, 22; PC, 5 Sept 1994, I). Despite
these hostile developments, Com-
mander of the Bougainville Revolu-
tionary Army Sam Kauona met with
senior Papua New Guinea officials on
26 and 27 August at the Tambea resort
near Honiara. At this time, of course,
Chan's political future was uncertain,
but three days after he was elected
prime minister, he flew to Honiara to
meet with Kauona. The result was the
Honiara Commitments to Peace on
Bougainville signed by Chan and
Kauona on 3 September.
The agreement declared peace, pro-
vided for a negotiated ceasefire within
seven days, the deployment of the
regional peacekeeping force "as soon
as practically possible" thereafter, the
lifting of the blockade, and a pan-
Bougainville peace conference to be
convened no later than 10 October
1994. The Honiara Commitments
were rightly hailed as a major break-
through. Unlike earlier agreements,
this one involved a key figure in the
rebel leadership directly, it allowed for
the neutral third-party involvement
that rebel leaders had long insisted on,
and it left the agenda for the proposed
peace conference more or less open.
Yet the peace conference effectively
collapsed soon after it was convened in
Arawa on 10 October, when the top
leadership of the Bougainville Revolu-
tionary Army, including Kauona,
refused to participate.
Perhaps the single most important
of the many elements contributing to
the breakdown of the peace process
was the pace of events (see eg, Spriggs
1994). A comprehensive ceasefire
agreement was signed on 8 September,
within the seven days agreed to in the
Honiara Commitments (PC, 12 Sept
1994,41). However, it was unrealistic
to expect that Kauona would have
time to discuss the many detailed pro-
visions of the agreement with his COill-'
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manders before the ceasefire took
effect at midnight on 9 September. Evi-
dence suggests that he remained in
Honiara and made little effort to do
so. Meanwhile, government officials
moved at breakneck speed to get the
peacekeeping force established ;md in
place in time for the peace conference.
The cabinet approved a status-of-
forces agreement to allow foreign
troops to operate on Papua New
Guinea soil (TPNG, 2 Sept 1994, 3).
Fiji, Tonga, and Vanuatu agreed to
provide troops for the force, while
Australia and New Zealand agreed to
provide funding, training, and logisti-
cal support. On 28 September, Chan
flew to Fiji to sign a status-of-elements
agreement with representatives of par-
ticipating governments, and shortly
afterward the South Pacific Peacekeep-
ing Force began training in Australia
(PC, 4 Oct 1994, 14-15).
By the end of September, there were
clear signs that Sam Kauona was
uneasy with the way things were
going. Perhaps the most obvious signal
was his refusal to accompany Chan to
Fiji for the signing ceremony, but his
apparent reluctance to return to Bou-
gainville was also cause for concern.
At the end of the first week of October,
still in Honiara, he warned that Chan
was "rushing things" and reportedly
requested that the peace conference be
postponed to give his side more time to
get organized (PC, 7 Oct 1994, I). By
this time, however, arrangements were
well advanced, and Chan was even
sending out invitations to foreign dig-
nitaries to witness the signing of the
agreement he assumed would eventu-
ate from the Arawa conference. Long
before the conference opened, the top
leadership of the Bougainville Revolu-
tionary Army had lost any semblance
of control over the peace agenda
(Spriggs 1994, 19-21).
The strength of the peace initiative
lay precisely in Chan's careful and con-
scious attempt to court Kauona and
treat him as an equal party to the
Honiara agreement. This aspect was
increasingly neglected as time went on,
perhaps because Chan, distracted by
other government business and partic-
ularly by the disastrous Rabaul vol-
canic eruption of 19 September, was
less involved in day-to-day develop-
ments. Other officials, including the
Australian military officers orchestrat-
ing the peace-force deployment, were
clearly less sensitive to such issues, and
elements of the Papua New Guinea
security forces may have actively
attempted to derail the peace process.
Rumors circulated of a plot to assassi-
nate Kauona, rebel President Francis
Ona, and Chair of the Interim Govern-
ment Joseph Kabui, should they
appear at the conference, and in the
end the leaders made total withdrawal
of Papua New Guinea security forces a
condition of their participation (TPNG,
13 Oct 1994, I; 20 Oct 1994,4;
Spriggs 1994, 21-22).
Prime Minister Chan, who had
staked a great deal on the peace initia-
tive, had little option but to declare the
Arawa conference a success (TPNG, 17
Nov 1994, 10). At least it had demon-
strated the willingness of many leaders
to negotiate a settlement with the Port
Moresby government (Dorney I994b;
Weeks 1994). On 18 October, the Bou-
gainville Revolutionary Army's "legal
advisor" Theodore Miriung, more
than a dozen rebel commanders from
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the north Nasioi area, and many
others signed an agreement to that
effect (TPNG, 27 Oct 1994,4). On 25
November, Miriung, Nick Peniai, and
Thomas Anis reached agreement with
the government regarding the political
future of Bougainville. The Charter of
Mirigini for a New Bougainville pro-
vided for the establishment of a Bou-
gainville Transitional Government by
March 1995 and called for the renego-
tiation of the 1976 Bougainville Agree-
ment, which had set the terms for the
settlement of an earlier secessionist
crisis (PC, 28 Nov 1994, 2). The top
leaders of the Bougainville Revolution-
ary Army, whom Chan now describes
as criminals, may have been marginal-
ized by the events of 1994 (PC, 2 Nov
1994, I). However, they retain the
ability to disrupt any political settle-
ment that falls short of their expec-
tations.
Both Wingti and Chan encountered
secessionist sentiments elsewhere in the
country during 1994 as the battle over
provincial government reform contin-
ued (Wesley-Smith 1994,451-452).
The first major confrontation came in
early April, when the premiers of the
New Guinea Islands provinces assem-
bled in Kimbe, East New Britain, to
consider their latest response to the
national government's ongoing reform
efforts. The premiers had previously
made clear their preference for more
autonomy within a united Papua New
Guinea, and had threatened to secede
if it were not granted. To make the
threat more credible on this occasion,
copies of the constitution of the pro-
posed Federated Melanesian Republic
were made available to the press (PC, 7
April 1994, 2). This time, the Wingti
government adopted a hard line,
threatening to arrest the leaders for
sedition if they voted to secede. In an
extraordinary move, Communication
Minister Martin Thompson ordered
the National Broadcasting Commis-
sion not to cover the Kimbe meeting in
order to avoid inflaming "racial or sec-
tional feelings" (PC, 7 April 1994, I,
3). When the meeting was convened,
the premiers appeared to have backed
down and secession was not discussed
(IBP, May 1994, 16).
In early September, the premiers
engineered another confrontation
with the newly elected Chan govern-
ment. They demanded "absolute
autonomy" for each of the island prov-
inces by 7 December, or independence
would be declared on 6 January 1995
(PC, 8 Sept 1994,5), The response of
the Chan government, at that time pre-
occupied with the Bougainville peace
initiative, was somewhat confused. At
first the prime minister indicated that
the issues raised by the premiers were
nonnegotiable, but almost immediately
he dispatched a senior minister, Arnold
Marsipal, to meet with them (PC, 9
Sept 1994, I; 12 Sept 1994, 3). Marsi-
pal's discussions were interrupted by
the Rabaul volcanic eruption, but in
November the leaders were summoned
to Port Moresby for further talks with
Deputy Prime Minister Chris Haiveta.
A few days earlier Chan had provided
some additional incentive for the pre-
miers to attend by authorizing the
police to lay treason charges against
them (PC, 14 Nov 1994, 3; 17 Nov
1994, I). Both sides appeared satisfied
with the results of the talks, and the
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island leaders declared that secession
was no longer an issue (PC, 21 Nov
1994,5),
The island premiers may not remain
satisfied for long if Chan persists in his
stated support for the reforms pro-
posed by the Constitutional Commis-
sion (PC, 18 Nov 1994, 3; 21 Nov
1994, I). On the other hand, Chan's
support must have been warmly wel-
comed by commission chair Ben
Micah. Although the Wingti govern-
ment had endorsed his proposals at the
beginning of the year, the implement-
ing bills were first deferred and later,
after Micah completed a grueling tour
of the provinces, withdrawn for
redrafting. Micah might have expected
opposition in the provinces, but he
may not have anticipated the difficulty
of keeping the national politicians on
task. After Provincial Affairs Minister
John Nilkare told a meeting of the Pre-
miers Council in July that the issue was
still open for debate, Micah urged the
cabinet to get on with the reforms. "If
they cannot make a decision," he said,
"they'd better bloody tell the nation"
(PC, 29 July 1994, 5).
Even if the massive opposition to
provincial government reform could
have been overcome in 1994, the cost
of implementing the reforms would
probably have delayed action. This
was a watershed year in Papua New
Guinea's economic history, one that,
according to Finance Minister Chris
Haiveta, brought the country to "the
very brink of international bank-
ruptcy" (TPNG, 10 Nov 1994, 18). The
economy itself remained reasonably
buoyant, with the nonmining sector in
particular enjoying the benefits of
37 1
rising export commodity prices. The
problems that emerged in 1994 were
the accumulated results of several
years of poor macroeconomic manage-
ment, previously an area of strength
for Papua New Guinea. The hallmark
of the crisis was a ballooning budget-
ary deficit, most of it unplanned. The
deficit was 233 million kina in 1992
and a further 297 million kina was
added in 1993. By mid-I994 another
284 million kina had been accrued, to
make a massive accumulated deficit of
about 810 million kina (TPNG, 10 Nov
1994,19). Another symptom was a
sharp reduction in foreign exchange
reserves, which by June were barely
adequate to cover one month's worth
of imports. By the end of the year, gov-
ernment services were virtually para-
lyzed by lack of funds, some public
servants were not getting paid, and the
government owed an estimated A$200
million to private companies (TPNG, I
Dec 1994, 2).
The rising deficit was partly the
result ofunrealistic estimates of gov-
ernment revenue built into the 1993
and 1994 budgets. The 1993 budget,
for example, assumed continued rapid
economic growth driven by foreign
investment, and introduced tax conces-
sions to encourage this trend, which
did not eventuate, in part because of
the uncertainty in the minerals sector
generated by other government poli-
cies. As a result, government revenue
did not rise as rapidly as planned, and
the problem was compounded in the
1994 budget, which was similarly opti-
mistic. However, the main difficulty
has been on the expenditure side of the
equation, where costs have consis-
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tently been underestimated. For exam-
ple, the sum of 10 million kina was
earmarked for the Bougainville opera-
tion in 1994, when actual costs were
more than 60 million kina a year.
More important, departments have
been able to routinely overspend their
budgets, often by considerable
amounts (TPNG, 13 Oct 1994, 2). In
what Haiveta described as "a massive
spending binge," government expendi-
tures rose by 14.3 percent in 1992,
18.2 percent in 1993, and an estimated
23 percent in 1994 (TPNG, 10 Nov
1994,19)·
Some of these problems were
acknowledged by Masket Iangalio
when he took over as finance minister
in January, but his March minibudget
did little to reverse the negative trends.
It restored some of the "mosquito
taxes" that Finance Minister Chan had
removed in 1993, but failed to make a
significant dent in government spend-
ing (TPNG, 10 March 1994, 2). In
June, the seriousness of the situation
became more apparent when Iangalio
tried to negotiate an overseas loan of
us$I60 million to cover the budget
deficit. Eventually a syndicate of banks
headed by the Union Bank of Switzer-
land agreed to lend US$90 million, but
on condition that it be repaid directly
from mining and oil revenues (PC, 9
June 1994, 3). Opposition Leader
Chris Haiveta decried the deal as a
"scandalous and criminal sellout"
(TPNG, 30 June 1994, I). In August,
however, the government changed, and
it was his turn to deal with the crisis.
On I I September Haiveta
announced a 12 percent devaluation of
the kina, in part to relieve speculative
pressure on foreign reserves, which
had been depleted by US$120 million
in August alone (PC, 12 Sept 1994, I).
When currency speculation continued,
the Chan government decided on more
radical action and announced that the
long-standing "hard kina" policy
would be abandoned. Instead of being
tied to the value of a basket of major
currencies, the value of the kina would
henceforth be determined largely by
market forces. The value of the kina
dropped still further after the float,
providing an incentive to exporters but
increasing the domestic cost of living
through higher prices for imports.
In November, the government
announced that it would defer the
budget until March 1995 and passed
a temporary "supply bill" to cover
the first three months of the year. The
bill introduced a range of revenue-
generating measures, foreshadowed
the sale of investments in mining and
oil projects worth at least 50 million
kina, and called for a 7.5 percent cut in
public service positions (TPNG, 10 Nov
1994,17-21). According to the critics,
much more drastic remedial action was
required, especially in the area of gov-
ernment spending. Negotiations were
under way at the end of the year for a
loan and aid package to cover the pro-
jected US$2I 5 million balance of pay-
ments deficit for 1995. The donors, led
by the World Bank, were reportedly
eager to make the deal contingent on
government restructuring, privatiza-
tion of nonessential services, an end to
rural subsidies, and increased invest-
ment in education, health, and infra-
structure (SMH, 16 Jan 1995, 7).
Critics were equally dismayed at the
slow progress on the Lihir gold mine,
which is expected to playa crucial role
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in offsetting declining revenues from
other large-scale resource projects. In
recent years, a number of government
ministers have pursued contradictory
policies concerning the ownership
structure of the project. Early in 1994,
Prime Minister Wingti still seemed to
support an earlier commitment to
bring the Malaysian Mining Corpora-
tion into the deal on favorable terms
(PC, 25 March 1994, 55). Finance
Minister Masket Iangalio, on the other
hand, seemed determined to pursue
the ownership option that he had
negotiated in late 1993 with the
project's developer, Rio Tinto Zinc.
Meanwhile, John Kaputin, who had
replaced Iangalio as mining minister in
January, appeared to side with Wingti,
but made his support for landowners
and his deep distrust of Rio Tinto clear
(PC, 6 May 1994, I). In April, Iangalio
gained the upper hand when he ousted
Wingti adviser and architect of the
Malaysian deal Bob Needham as direc-
tor of the Mineral Resources Develop-
ment Corporation (pRo 18 April 1994,
3)' By August, Iangalio's victory
seemed complete when Kaputin,
swayed by a critical consultant's
report, indicated that he would no
longer be guided by the Needham plan
(TPNG, 21 July 1994, 26).
Soon after assuming power in
August, Prime Minister Chan declared
his intention to "fast-track" the Lihir
project and ruled out any special deal
for the Malaysians (PC, I Sept 1994,
3I). In mid-December, Mining Minis-
ter John Giheno announced that the
government would take 30 percent of
the equity in the project and pass half
on to Lihir landowners, who had ear-
lier insisted on 20 percent. Rio Tinto
l!III
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Zinc and Niugini Mining would take
40 percent and 30 percent respectively
(PC, 14 Dec 1994, I). This agreement
appeared to leave the way clear for the
issue of a special mining lease early in
1995 and for the public share float to
raise some A$3 50 million toward
developing the A$900-million project.
By dumping waste and tailings at
sea, the Lihir mine may avoid some of
the environmental issues that have
plagued other large-scale projects in
Papua New Guinea. By the end of the
year, the fate of the 2.75 billion kina
lawsuit brought by landowners on the
Fly and Ok Tedi Rivers against Broken
Hill Proprietary, the operator of the
Ok Tedi copper mine, for environ-
mental damage, remained unclear
(PC, 14 Sept 1994, 2). Of more imme-
diate concern for the Chan government
was the cost of the natural environ-
mental disaster that displaced more
than fifty thousand people and largely
destroyed Rabaul in East New Britain
in September (TPNG, 22 Sept 1994, I).
The relief effort, known rather
euphemistically as Operation Unity,
placed a further strain on tight gov-
ernment resources, and a source for
the estimated 34 million kina required
to rebuild the town had not been
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VANUATU
The coalition government of Maxim
Carlot Korman consolidated its posi-
tion during 1994, overcoming opposi-
tion maneuvering and an extended
strike by public servants. It replaced
the district councils with six provincial
councils and attempted to improve
economic management and reduce
irresponsible forestry exploitation.
In January the government replaced
Vanuatu's long-serving representative
to the United Nations, Robert Van
Lierop, with Jean Ravo. Van Lierop
had established a good reputation, and
his replacement appeared to reflect
concern over his earlier connections
with Anglophone opposition politi-
cians. Around the sam£time Vanua-
scope, which had been Vanuatu's only
privately owned newspaper, closed
down after a year of publication,
though apparently from poor profit-
ability rather than political pressure.
On 28 February Jimmy Moli
Stephens (also spelt Stevens) died at his
home on Espiritu Santo, after a long
period of ill health. He had been
released from jail in 1991, following
his imprisonment for leading an abor-
tive secessionist attempt in Espiritu
Santo and nearby islands in 1980.
Electing a new national president to
replace Fred Timakata, following the
completion of his term, was a drawn-
out process. The opposition boycotted
the first poll on 14 February. They
complained that the electoral college
had not been given appropriate formal
notification, and were hopeful that
blocking the process might oblige the
holding of early national elections. At
a second vote on 16 February, neither
candidate gained the required two-
thirds majority. Finally, on 2 March,
Jean-Marie Leye was elected president.
The public servants' strike, which
had begun on 24 November 1993,
continued into April 1994, attracting
some support from other employees.
The strikers had demanded a 16 per-
cent pay raise, to compensate for the
erosion of their salaries by inflation
over the preceding five years. Follow-
ing a court ruling that the strike was
POLITICAL REVIEWS
illegal, because the union leaders had
failed to pursue negotiations suffi-
ciently before calling it, the Public
Service Commission resolved to sack
all striking public servants, on the
basis that they could reapply for their
positions once these were readver-
tised. After the sacking of about six
hundred workers, the strike came to
an end.
Father Lini and his National United
Party (NUP) pursued cooperation with
the other opposition parties during the
year, but Lini also kept his options
open by discussing the possible return
of his party to the governing coalition,
in which Korman's Union of Moderate
Parties (UMP) remained the dominant
group. Lini and his supporters also
criticized NUP members Sethy Regen-
vanu, Edward Tambisari, and Cecil
Sinker. These three members of parlia-
ment had remained with the govern-
ment when the coalition broke down
in August 1993, thus enabling the
government to retain office. At its
congress in May, the National United
Party expelled the three men and
their political staff. The expelled
group formed itself into a new body,
the People's Democratic Party, on
18 May.
Assisted by continuing tensions
between and within the various oppo-
sition parties, which contributed to
their failure to appear credible as an
alternative and thus attract defectors
from government ranks, Prime Minis-
ter Korman comfortably defeated a
no-confidence motion on 2 June by 25
votes to 19, with one member of par-
liament not voting. The proponents of
the vote had criticized the government
for sacking civil servants in order to
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break their strike, for breaches of the
leadership code, and for poor eco-
nomic management.
At the fifteenth annual conference
of the Union of Moderate Parties, held
from 18 to 23 July on Atchin Island off
the eastern coast of Malekula, Korman
and his colleagues expressed confi-
dence that their party was going from
strength to strength and would be able
to win government in its own right in
the next national elections, which are
due by late 1995. But the results of the
provincial government elections on 15
November suggested that their confi-
dence may have been excessive.
These elections had become neces-
sary following the implementation of a
decentralization bill, passed early in
May, which replaced the eleven pro-
vincial councils established around the
time of independence with six provin-
cial councils. From north to south in
the archipelago, the new provinces
consisted of Torba (Torres, Banks, and
nearby smaller islands), Sanma (Espir-
itu Santo, Malo, and nearby smaller
islands), Penama (Ambae, Maewo,
Pentecost, and nearby smaller islands),
Malampa (Malekula, Ambrym,
Paama, and nearby smaller islands),
Shefa (Epi, Shepherds, Efate, and
nearby smaller islands), and Tafea
(Erromango, Tanna, Anatom, Aniwa,
and Futuna). The powers of the new
councils would remain limited, but the
government envisaged that the foster-
ing of commercial centers in the capital
of each province would provide an
alternative for young people, checking
urban drift to Port Vila.
The elections were held under a
newly introduced proportional voting
system that gave an advantage to
w" • "'''''''''''9"+ e -
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larger and well-organized political
groupings while disadvantaging
smaller parties and independents. The
three groupings that contested the poll
each won control of two of the six new
provincial councils. The Union of
Moderate Parties gained 19,509 votes
overall and won office in Tafea and
Sanma. The United Front-a coalition
of the Vanua'aku Pati, the Melanesian
Progressive Party, the Tan Union, and
Nagriamel-gained 19,995 votes and
won control of Shefa, the most popu-
lous province, and Malampa. For its
part, the National United Party, with
11,174 votes overall, won control of
Torba and Penama. The minority party
in the national governing coalition,
Sethy Regenvanu's People's Demo-
cratic Party, did not take part in the
poll. A party press communique
explained that this nonparticipation
had been because the Korman govern-
ment had failed to gain full cabinet
approval for decisions relating to some
of the election arrangements. But the
main reason for nonparticipation may
have been the party's failure to com-
plete the required formalities within
the prescribed time.
During the year the planned estab-
lishment of the "Santo Mini-Township
and Industrial Park" adjacent to
Luganville (Santo Town) on Espiritu
Santo sparked controversy. Financed
by Taiwanese interests, the project
involves the settlement of up to three
thousand Taiwanese in the new center.
At the foundation-laying ceremony on
17 June, Prime Minister Korman
stressed the development opportunities
offered by the project, but its oppo-
nents claimed that the proposed immi-
grants would deprive local workers
of employment and their presence
would have other negative effects on
ni-Vanuatu interests.
From the middle of the year
Vanuatu's new president, Jean-Marie
Leye, attracted criticism. In July he
pardoned a Taiwanese fishing captain
recently sentenced to six years' jail for
illegal fishing in Vanuatu's exclusive
economic zone, and ordered the release
of the captain's impounded vessel. In
addition, the prisoners to whom he
granted early release to mark Indepen-
dence Day on 30 July included one
criminal with a long record of rape
and other violent offenses. The rumor
circulated that a five-million-vatu
bribe had been paid to secure the
release of the Taiwanese captain and
his vessel. Father Lini said in parlia-
ment that he understood that, with
respect to their release, the president
had been following government
instructions. In November the govern-
ment took the president to court over
the fishing case to establish whether he
had acted beyond his constitutional
jurisdiction (v~ 26 Nov 1994, 1).
Concern continued during the year
over violence against and involving
women. A Health Department repre-
sentative, Louis Nako, told partici-
pants in a workshop on women and
violence held on Tanna in July that
rape was becoming a game or competi-
tion played by men on Tanna (v~ 28
July 1994,9). In September Chief
Justice Charles Vaudin d'Imecourt
said it appeared that assaults on
women in Vanuatu had become almost
an accepted fact of life and were a
"growing disease" (v~ 24 Sept 1994,
5). Women also engaged in violence,
notably in attacks on unfaithful hus-
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bands. During the year to August
1994, more than 40 percent of the
defendants in violence-related court
cases were women (VW; 6 Aug 1994,
5). In November, the Vanuatu
National Council of Women claimed
that the status of women was very low
in Vanuatu compared to other coun-
tries (VW; 6 Nov 1994,5).
Corruption and maladministration
also remained a cause for concern. In
December 1993 the government had
disbanded a commission of inquiry,
headed by Clarence Marae, who him-
self had earlier been subject to corrup-
tion charges, which had reported
evidence of high-level corruption.
Rumors and allegations continued to
surface during 1994, but the govern-
ment was mostly reluctant to pursue
them. The government did, however,
establish Vanuatu's first ombudsman
on 7 July, in an apparent effort to
improve administrative standards and
protect citizens' rights. Madame Marie
Noelle Ferrieux Patterson, a French-
born citizen of Vanuatu, was
appointed. She has legal and other aca-
demic qualifications, and previously
had been a partner in a real estate busi-
ness. More controversially, the govern-
ment appointed Mr Luke Siba as chief
of police on 9 September. He had
served as a French police officer before
independence, and afterward as a ni-
Vanuatu police officer until 1981. But
he also, as opposition politicians com-
plained, had served time in prison for
dangerous driving in 1979, theft in
1982, and misappropriation of funds
and theft in 1983.
During the year the Korman gov-
ernment maintained constructive rela-
tions with traditional partners,
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including France, Australia, and the
other Melanesian countries, but also
consolidated and diversified Vanuatu's
other international links, notably with
Malaysia. In May the prime minister
took part in the first world conference
on sustainable development in small
island countries, in Bridgetown, Bar-
bados. (Ms Hilda Lini, MP, also took
part, as a member of an Eminent Per-
son's Group.) In July, Mr Korman's
government accredited, for the first
time, an Israeli ambassador, who will
serve on a nonresident basis. The non-
resident ambassadors of the United
States, Japan, Italy, and Spain also
visited during the year.
In July Prime Minister Korman
attended the eighth meeting of the
Melanesian Spearhead Group, held at
Auki in Malaita, Solomon Islands, and
endorsed efforts to encourage further
cooperation between the Melanesian
countries. In August he took part in
the South Pacific Forum, held in Bris-
bane, Australia, and supported initia-
tives to improve regional and country-
level management of fisheries, forests,
and other natural resources. On his
return from the Forum his government
foreshadowed legislation to ban the
export of unprocessed timber, in
order to oblige foreign timber com-
panies to invest in processing facilities
in Vanuatu. The ban is to be phased
in gradually, however, and may prove
less effective than would at first
appear.
Forestry exploitation was a major
theme of the prime minister's visit to
Malaysia in early November. Visiting
there on his way back from France, he
received, according to the Vanuatu
Weekly, "an exceptional welcome"
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(v~ 19 Nov 1994, 3). He had several
discussions with Prime Minister
Mahathir and engaged in other consul-
tations. After visiting the Forest
Research Institute of Malaysia, Mr
Korman said that Vanuatu had sought
Malaysia's technological expertise to
assist in Vanuatu's sustainable develop-
ment. He welcomed Malaysian invest-
ment in forestry and other ventures,
but noted that his government's policy
was to preserve 50 percent of the
virgin forest on each island (v~ 19
Nov 1994, 5). Some observers were
concerned, however, about the record
of some Malaysian timber companies.
Doubts also arose about Vanuatu's
ability to monitor major logging
projects effectively (see v~ I I June
1994, I).
Consistent with its membership of
the South Pacific Forum and the Mela-
nesian Spearhead Group, Vanuatu wel-
comed the opportunity to deploy
members of the Vanuatu Mobile Force
in peacekeeping operations in Bou-
gainville in early October. Fifty person-
nel were sent to join those of Fiji and
Tonga in the South Pacific Peacekeep-
ing Force. The deployment received
broad support in Vanuatu, and the
conduct of the Vanuatu Mobile Force
members was well regarded in Bou-
gainville. They proved especially useful
as Pidgin-English interpreters in inter-
actions between local people and the
Fijians and Tongans.
Copra remained Vanuatu's most
lucrative export crop, despite generally
poor prices on the international
market. Other exports included timber,
beef, cocoa, kava, and coffee. The
economy remained sluggish, with
hopes for improvement centered on
forestry, tourism, and economic
restructuring, notably the trimming of
the public sector. In November the
government foreshadowed a planned
reduction during 1995 of 20 percent of
public service jobs.
Overall during 1994, the Korman
government demonstrated, compared
with 1992 and 1993, greater assurance
in its handling of Vanuatu's domestic
and external affairs. It remains to be
seen whether this serenity will be
maintained in the lead-up to the
national elections in late 1995.
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